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On the relationship between personal experience, affect and risk perception:
The case of climate changeSANDER VAN DER LINDEN1,2*
1Yale Project on Climate Change Communication, School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale
University, New Haven, USA; 2Department of Geography and the Environment and Grantham Research
Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), London, UKAbstract
Examining the conceptual relationship between personal experience, affect, and risk perception is crucial in improving our under-
standing of how emotional and cognitive process mechanisms shape public perceptions of climate change. This study is the ﬁrst to
investigate the interrelated nature of these variables by contrasting three prominent social-psychological theories. In the ﬁrst model,
affect is viewed as a fast and associative information processing heuristic that guides perceptions of risk. In the second model, affect
is seen as ﬂowing from cognitive appraisals (i.e., affect is thought of as a post-cognitive process). Lastly, a third, dual-process model
is advanced that integrates aspects from both theoretical perspectives. Four structural equation models were tested on a national
sample (N=808) of British respondents. Results initially provide support for the “cognitive”model, where personal experience with
extreme weather is best conceptualized as a predictor of climate change risk perception and, in turn, risk perception a predictor of
affect. Yet, closer examination strongly indicates that at the same time, risk perception and affect reciprocally inﬂuence each other in
a stable feedback system. It is therefore concluded that both theoretical claims are valid and that a dual-process perspective provides
a superior ﬁt to the data. Implications for theory and risk communication are discussed. © 2014 The Authors. European Journal of
Social Psychology published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.A “risk” is not something that exists “out there”, independent
of our minds and culture (Slovic, 1992, p. 119). Indeed, unlike
a physical threat or danger, the human notion of risk is a men-
tal construct (Sjöberg, 1979), it cannot be sensed—it is only
perceived (Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1983). Climate
change is mostly a statistical concept, referring to the average
long-term variability in the earth’s climate (Solomon et al.,
2007), and as such, it cannot be experienced directly (Swim
et al., 2011). Compared with many other hazards, the threat
of climate change is therefore relatively unique: not only be-
cause of its scope and breadth (Breakwell, 2010) but also in
the sense that it is not directly “situated” in our daily environ-
ment (Helgeson, van der Linden, & Chabay, 2012).
Nevertheless, an increasing amount of research has shown
that people can (to some extent) accurately detect changes in
their local climate and relate this perceptual experience to
climate change (e.g., Akerlof, Maibach, Fitzgerald, Cedeno, &
Neuman, 2013; Howe et al., 2013; Joireman, Truelove, & Duell,
2010). Moreover, the rising incidence rate of extreme weather
events is now increasingly being associated with climate change
(Coumou & Rahmstorf, 2012). In fact, a number of studies
have indicated that personal experience with extreme weather
events is a signiﬁcant predictor of climate change risk per-
ceptions (e.g., Akerlof et al., 2013; Brody, Zahran, Vedlitz, &*Correspondence to: Sander van der Linden, Yale Project on Climate Change Co
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provided the original work is properly cited.Grover, 2008; Krosnick, Holbrook, Lowe, & Visser, 2006;
Spence, Poortinga, Butler, & Pidgeon, 2011).
Personal experience also plays a key role in affective process-
ing, as affective responses are essentially formed through learn-
ing and experience (Damasio, 1994). An “affective” response is
usually deﬁned as a fast, associative, and automatic reaction that
guides information processing and judgment (Zajonc, 1980). It
is often described as a faint whisper of emotion, deﬁned specif-
ically as a positive (like) or negative (dislike) evaluative feeling
toward a stimulus that can occur both consciously and uncon-
sciously (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004). Risk
perception often concerns future events (Sjöberg, 2000) and be-
cause affective evaluations of future risks largely depend on the
vividness with which negative consequences can be represented
mentally (Damasio, 1994;Weber, 2006), it logically follows that
personal experience with the impacts of climate change and
affective processing are closely interrelated (Marx et al., 2007).
However, it is not only direct personal experience and affec-
tive processing that go hand in hand. In fact, it is often pro-
posed that any perception (including risk) inevitably
contains some affect (Zajonc, 1980). Indeed, negative affect
has shown to be an important predictor of climate change risk
perceptions (e.g., Leiserowitz, 2006; Sundblad, Biel, &
Gärling, 2007).mmunication, School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University,
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Personal experience, affect and risk perception 431Taken together, these research ﬁndings raise a number
of important and unresolved questions about the relationship
between personal experience, affect, and risk perception: does
personal experience with extreme weather predict affective
judgments? And in turn, do these affective judgments guide
public risk perceptions of climate change? Or does personal
experience predict risk perception, and in turn, does risk
perception predict affect? Alternatively, is it possible that
personal experience predicts risk perception and that risk
perception and affect simultaneously and reciprocally inﬂu-
ence each other?
In short, past research has failed to address the cognition-
emotion dilemma in the context of climate change. Doing so
is important because more effective public engagement with
climate change necessitates risk communication strategies that
can better take into account the way in which cognitive and
experiential processes shape and inﬂuence public perceptions
of climate change (Marx et al., 2007). As I will illustrate in
the next section, the conceptual relationship between personal
experience, affect, and risk perceptions of climate change can
be represented within the frame of three competing social-
psychological theories.THE PRESENT STUDYModel 1: Affect as an Information Processing Heuristic
Much research on affective processing assumes (either implic-
itly or explicitly) that affect is a driver of risk perception
(rather than vice versa). For example, Zajonc (1980) unmistakably
states that “affective judgments are fairly independent of, and pre-
cede in time, perceptual and cognitive operations” (p.1). In a sim-
ilar vein, Slovic, Finucane, Peters and MacGregor (2007) assume
that “the affect heuristic guides perceptions of risk” (p. 1343). The
notion that people rely on affective cues when making risk judg-
ments is pervasive and based on a substantial amount of experi-
mental as well as clinical research (e.g., Damasio, 1994; Dohle,
Keller, & Siegrist, 2010; Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson,
2000; Johnson & Tverksy, 1983; LeDoux, 1996; Schwartz &
Clore, 1983; Zajonc, 1984). The underlying idea is that fast affec-
tive judgments are an evolutionarily adaptive and efﬁcient way of
processing information, especially when navigating in a complex,
uncertain, and dangerous world (Slovic et al., 2007).
Until now (and with good reason), affect has mostly been
conceptualized as a predictor of climate change risk percep-
tions (e.g., Leiserowitz, 2006; Smith & Leiserowitz, 2012;
Sundblad et al., 2007). In line with this view, the hypothesized
causal relationship is expected to be unidirectional, where
more personal experience with extreme weather leads to the
development of negative affective evaluations, which in turn
cultivate higher risk perceptions of climate change. A descrip-
tion of the “affective” model is presented in Figure 1.Figure 1. Hypothesized causal ﬂow model 1 (the “affective” model)
© 2014 The Authors. European Journal of Social Psychology published by JohnModel 2: Affect as a Post-Cognitive Process
Other recent experimental research has questioned the extent
to which affect can be seen as an associative construct (e.g.,
Townsend, Spence, & Knowles, 2013) and suggested appraisal
theory as a means of understanding the role of emotion in risk
perception (e.g., Keller et al., 2012). In fact, diametrically op-
posed to Zajonc (1980, 1984), Lazarus (1981, 1984) proposed
that cognitive processes mediate the relation between environ-
mental situations and speciﬁc emotional reactions (i.e., emotions
are seen as a post-cognitive process). In order to explain how
different people can experience different emotions in identical
situations, Lazarus argued that events are ﬁrst appraised (i.e.,
perceived and interpreted) in terms of their personal meaning
(i.e., how they relate to an individual’s past experiences,
personal values, and overall well-being). Like information
processing theories, “appraisal theory” hasmarshaled substantial
empirical support (e.g., Roseman, 1984; Scherer, Schorr, &
Johnstone, 2001; Siemer, Mauss, & Gross, 2007). In fact,
Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, and Welch (2001) state “few
would question that cognitive evaluations give rise to affective
responses” (p. 271).
In support of this view, Kobbeltved, Brun, Johnsen, and
Eid (2005) reported in their (cross-lagged) panel study that
“it is unlikely that our subjects allowed their affective impres-
sions to guide their risk judgments” (p. 431). Instead, the
authors note that over time, risk judgments gave rise to negative
emotions but not vice versa. Thus, in line with this paradigm
(and in contrast to the affect-heuristic hypothesis), an alternative
hypothesized causal relationship is one where more personal
experience with extreme weather events leads to higher risk
perceptions, which in turn, create (more) negative affective eval-
uations of climate change. A description of the “cognitive”
model is presented in Figure 2.
Model 3: A Dual-Processing Perspective—The Case of
Climate Change
It is important to recognize, however, that both theoretical
perspectives have validity and are not mutually exclusive.
For example, although it is now obvious that certain older,
subcortical structures in the brain can receive (sensory) infor-
mation independently of the neocortical structures related to
cognition (LeDoux, 1996), when an individual is faced with
extreme weather he or she is likely to activate both affective
processing (e.g., danger) and cognitive information about its
ontological category (e.g., tornado and climate change).
Indeed, humans perceive risk in two fundamental ways,
namely, in a cognitive-analytical and experiential-affective
manner (Slovic & Peters, 2006). Yet, there is an increasing
consensus that the way in which affect functions in relation
to cognition is strongly dependent on the context (Lai,
Hagoort, & Casasanto, 2012).Figure 2. Hypothesized causal ﬂow model 2 (the “cognitive” model)
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Figure 3. Hypothesized causalﬂowmodel 3 (the “dual-process”model)
432 S. van der LindenIn fact, Loewenstein et al. (2001) suggest that when cognitive
and emotional responses diverge, reactions are more likely to be
guided by affect. Yet, climate change is an evolutionarily novel
risk that does not represent a clearly observable physical danger,
and thus, there is no environmental cue present to automatically
trigger an affective, fear-based ﬁght-ﬂight type response that by-
passes cognition completely (Griskevicius, Cantu, & van Vugt,
2012; Weber, 2006). Instead, it is much more likely that when
someone personally experiences the likely consequences of cli-
mate change (i.e., extreme weather), the individual must ﬁrst
cognitively and causally attribute his or her perceptual experi-
ence to climate change (Weber, 2010; Helgeson et al., 2012).
At the same time, when this link has been made salient, it is
equally likely that negative affective reactions guide and exert
a strong inﬂuence over risk perceptions. This idea is consis-
tent with neurobiological evidence, which suggests that affect
can inﬂuence cognition and cognition can inﬂuence affect
(LeDoux, 1989). To this extent, appraisal studies have started
to conceptualize the link between emotion and cognition as
bi-directional (e.g., Nerb & Spada, 2001), and research is
now steadily moving toward a dual-process perspective—
where the interplay between emotion and cognition is increas-
ingly recognized (e.g., Clore & Ortony, 2000; Gray, 2004;
Loewenstein et al., 2001; Pessoa, 2008; Phelps, 2006). Con-
sistent with this view, the current study presents a dual-pro-
cess model (Figure 3), where more personal experience with
extreme weather is expected to predict higher risk percep-
tions, and while higher risk perceptions in turn predict affect,
negative affective evaluations are expected to simultaneously
inﬂuence and drive higher risk perceptions of climate
change. The purpose of the present research is to empiri-
cally evaluate the plausibility of all three hypothesized
model structures.METHODSample and Participants
The dataset consists of a national sample (N=808) of the popu-
lation of the United Kingdom. Because the UK has a high degree
of Internet users (about 77% of the population), the survey was
conducted online via a survey sampling company. A nationally
balanced quota sample1 (based on gender, age, and region)
was obtained from a large mixed panel of people who were will-
ing to participate in Web-based research for a small (symbolic)
reward. Multi-stage randomization was used to select partici-
pants from the panel. The sample comprised 50% male and
50% female respondents. The age of participants ranged be-
tween 18 and 65, with a modal age bracket of 35–44.1Quotas reﬂect the 2001 census data for the Great British population.
© 2014 The Authors. European Journal of Social Psychology published by JohnMaterials and Procedure
Because the survey is part of a larger study that aims to explore
and investigate a wide range of perceptions, attitudes, and
behaviors related to climate change, only relevant constructs
and results are reported here. The survey instrument was
designed with input from a panel of three academic and profes-
sional experts. Furthermore, to ensure that the survey questions
and response categories were clear and unambiguous, a pilot
study was conducted at the behavioral research lab of the
London School of Economics with a focus group of (N=15)
members of the general public. Results of the pilot study were
used to reﬁne the questionnaire. The survey was administered
online in October 2012 and took about 15–20min to complete.
Measures
Risk Perception
A total of eight measures were used to assess risk perception.
Drawing on standardized items developed by O’Connor, Bord,
and Fisher (1999) and Leiserowitz (2006), all constructs were
measured on seven-point (unipolar) Likert-type scales and
covered both spatial and temporal risk dimensions. The ﬁrst
two questions asked respondents to judge how likely they
think it is that they will personally experience threats to their
overall well-being as a result of climate change. The same
was asked for society as a whole. Three questions asked
respondents to evaluate how serious of a threat they think
climate change is to the natural environment, the UK, and to
them personally. Respondents were also asked how serious they
would rate current impacts around the world and how concerned
they are about climate change in general. For analysis, a holistic
measure of risk perception was created (α = .96).
Generalized Affect
Peters and Slovic (2007) tested and cross-compared numerous
ways of measuring self-reported affect (e.g., through imagery
and discrete emotions). The authors found that among all mea-
sures, broadly valenced or “holistic” affective evaluations
proved to be most reliable. Accordingly, generalized affect
was measured with three broadly evaluative bipolar adjective
scales, for example, “I feel that climate change is” (very un-
pleasant–pleasant, unfavorable–favorable, and negative–posi-
tive). A reliable scale was obtained (α = .85).
Personal Experience with Extreme Weather Events
Because rising sea levels are one of the most probable conse-
quences of climate change (Solomon et al., 2007), previous
research on extreme weather has predominantly focused on
ﬂooding events (e.g., Spence et al., 2011; Whitmarsh, 2008).
Yet, to account for a potentially wider range of personal expe-
riences with extreme weather, two separate questions were
used. Respondents were ﬁrst asked to recall how often in the
last 5 years they had experienced (i) ﬂooding and (ii) other
extreme weather events (e.g., severe heat waves, droughts,
and freak storms) while in the UK. An afﬁrmative response
to either question counted toward personal experience.
Responses were combined and dichotomized to form anWiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 44, 430–440 (2014)
Table 1. Factor loadings and scale reliabilities of measurement items
Risk perception measures Factor loadings Cronbach’s α
Risk perception index .96
Risk perception item 1 0.90
Risk perception item 2 0.72
Risk perception item 3 0.86
Risk perception item 4 0.91
Risk perception item 5 0.92
Risk perception item 6 0.86
Risk perception item 7 0.92
Risk perception item 8 0.76
Generalized affect index .85
Affect item 1 0.89
Affect item 2 0.91
Affect item 3 0.70
Note: All factor loadings are signiﬁcant at p< .001. Squared factor loadings
(λ2) indicate the amount of variance that the item explains in the laten
construct.
Personal experience, affect and risk perception 433index describing personal experience (0 = no experience,
1 = experience).
Cause Knowledge
Knowledge about the causes of climate change is used in the
current study as an auxiliary “instrument” (which is further
discussed in the following section). Measures that try to assess
subjective or “self-reported knowledge” with a single item
tend to be unreliable (Roser-Renouf & Nisbet, 2008). There-
fore, cause knowledge was assessed with 13 items that were
presented in random order (seven of which were correct state-
ments and six were incorrect). The correctness of all state-
ments was based on expert reports (e.g., Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)) and checked by two climate
scientists. Respondents were asked to what extent each item
(e.g., burning fossil fuels) contributes to climate change (i.e.,
major, minor, or no contribution). Following a method deve-
loped by Leiserowitz, Smith, andMarlon (2010), responses were
scored as either right (1) or wrong (0) and indexed (0–13) based
on the number of correct answers, where more correct answers
reﬂect higher knowledge. A reliable scale was obtained for cause
knowledge (α = .90).RESULTS2For detailed guidelines of goodness of ﬁt statistics in structural equation
modelling please see McDonald and Ho (2002) and Hu and Bentler (1999
for a good overview.Overview of Statistical Analyses
All analyses were performed using a latent variable structural
equation modeling (SEM) approach (Bollen, 2005; Ullman
& Bentler, 2013).
Recursive versus Nonrecursive Structural Equation Models
The hypothesized relationships of the “cognitive” and
“affective” models are estimated with a standard recursive (i.e.,
unidirectional) structural equation approach. However, the
dual-process model is estimated using a nonrecursive (i.e., a
feedback or bi-directional) structural equation model. Nonre-
cursive structural equation models are more complicated in the
sense that both variables (here risk perception and affect) are
thought to simultaneously “cause” or inﬂuence each other. The
problem of simultaneous causation is often addressed with
cross-laggedmodels, yet, this is certainly not always appropriate
because (i) the assumed “lag” between cause and effect is
usually unknown (Wong & Law, 1999) and (ii) cause does not
have to precede effect in time (e.g., it is entirely reasonable that
the perception of risk and the experience of negative affect occur
simultaneously or at least in short succession).
In fact, nonrecursive structural equation models estimated
on cross-sectional data implicitly make a so-called functional
equilibrium assumption (Schaubroeck, 1990) in order to
obtain unbiased regression estimates (Kenny, 1979). The
assumption implies that if a causal feedback loop has not fully
materialized or stabilized yet, cross-sectional data would not be
able to substantiate a synchronous bi-directional relationship.
Another important (and often neglected) assumption of
nonrecursive structural equation models is that they need to be
empirically identiﬁed (Kenny, 1979), which is only truly the© 2014 The Authors. European Journal of Social Psychology published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 44, 430–440 (2014tcase when each endogenous variable in the model has its own in-
strument (i.e., an exogenous variable that inﬂuences Y1 (affect) but
not Y2 (risk) and vice versa). In other words, if two variables are
believed to cause each other, a third variable (the instrument)
is needed to partition the variance into endogenous and exoge-
nous components.
For example, in the current study, a valid instrument would
be a variable that is signiﬁcantly correlated with affect but not
(or only marginally) to risk perception. The instrumental
variable approach to causal inference is a powerful but
underutilized tool in psychology (Bollen, 2012). In the current
study, knowledge about the causes of climate change is intro-
duced as an instrument. It is argued here that cause knowledge
is a valid instrument because it is both theoretically and empiri-
cally related to affect (Y1) but only marginally to risk perception
(Y2). To illustrate, in contrast to knowledge about the impacts of
climate change (which are often vivid descriptions of a risk
event), knowledge about the physical causes is expected to share
a much weaker theoretical link with risk perception. Particularly,
because regardless of whether climate change is seen as a natural
or human-caused threat, it remains a risk. Yet, the fact that it is
human-caused is likely to trigger strong negative emotional
reactions. Indeed, the main perceptual difference between natu-
ral and man-made risks often lies in negative affective reactions
toward the inﬂicting agent (Böhm, 2003; Brun, 1992).
Assessment of Model Fit
Model ﬁt is assessed using a range of goodness of ﬁt
statistics.2 The ﬁrst test statistic reported is the χ2 (Chi-
square)—for which lower values indicate better ﬁt. The
Comparative Fit Index and the Tucker Lewis Index are com-
parative (relative) ﬁt indices where a cutoff value of 0.95 indi-
cates good ﬁt and >0.95 excellent ﬁt. The root mean square
error approximation (RMSEA) is an absolute ﬁt index that
measures lack of ﬁt per degree of freedom, where cutoff values
between 0.05 and 0.10 indicate reasonable ﬁt and values
<0.05 excellent ﬁt. Nested models (i.e., when a model is
simply a less restricted version of the other) are assessed with))
Table 2. Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations
N= 808 Risk perception Generalized affect Cause knowledge Personal experience Mean Standard deviation
Risk perception (0.96) 4.83 1.36
Generalized affect 0.54*** (0.86) 5.33 1.20
Cause knowledge 0.09* 0.22*** (0.90) 6.24 1.92
Personal experience 0.22*** 0.08* 0.02 (1.0) N.A N.A
Note: Personal experience is a dichotomous variable (1 = experience, 0 = no experience). Measures are coded so that higher scores reﬂect more of the construct.
Reliability scores (α) are provided in parentheses along the main diagonal.
N.A, not applicable. *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001.
434 S. van der Lindena Chi-square difference test. Nonnested models are evaluated
with parsimony ﬁt indices such as the Akaike Information
Criterion and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) where
again, lower values indicate better ﬁt. More speciﬁcally, a
difference of 10 or more provides very strong evidence that
the model with the more negative values has better ﬁt
(Raftery, 1995).
Validating the Measurement Model
With regard to the measurement model, it is important to
ﬁrst establish sufﬁcient content and construct validity of the
measures. As discussed, most of the items used for risk
perception and affect are relatively standardized, and their
usefulness has been established in prior research. Nonetheless,
convergent and discriminant validity of the items is assessed
using the multitrait-multimethod approach (Campbell & Fiske,
1959) and conﬁrmatory factor analysis—for which results are
presented in Tables 1 and 2.
The factor loadings are provided in Table 1 and indicate
that all risk perception and affect items load highly on their
respective factors, illustrating good convergent validity
(Farrell & Rudd, 2009). In addition, the multitrait-
multimethod approach suggests that an item should correlate
more strongly with all items of the same construct than with
measures of other constructs (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). For
example, the items measuring risk perception should correlate
more strongly with each other than with the items measuring
affect. In other words, the intercorrelation between risk
perception and affect (r = .54) should not exceed the value of
Cronbach’s alpha (α = .96) given that α is an intra-class corre-
lation coefﬁcient. This is clearly the case, as Table 2 illustrates.
All intercorrelations are well below their mean scale reliabilities,
indicating sufﬁcient discriminant validity3 between the
measures (Farrell & Rudd, 2009).
The “Affective” versus “Cognitive” Model
The structural equation models were estimated using STATA’s
SEM package, StataCorp, College Station, Texas, USA.4,
and results are presented in Figures 4 and 5. The “affective”
model is presented ﬁrst in Figure 4, where affect is concep-
tualized as an antecedent of risk perception (i.e., cognition).3Similarly, the conﬁrmatory factor analysis results can be used to prove that
the shared variance (squared correlation) between each pair of constructs is
lower than the extracted variance (the average of the squared factor loadings).
4Because of some item nonresponse (approximately 10%), the model was es-
timated using a full information maximum likelihood procedure—which
produces unbiased estimates and is highly recommended (Enders &
Bandalos, 2001).
© 2014 The Authors. European Journal of Social Psychology published by JohnResults indicate that both paths, from personal experience to
negative affect (β = .10, SE= 0.04, p< .01) and from negative
affect to risk perception (β = .67, SE= 0.02, p< 0.001), are
signiﬁcant. Yet, while personal experience with extreme weather
seems to explain very little to no variance in negative affect
(R2=0.006), negative affect explains a substantial amount of
variance in risk perceptions of climate change (R2=0.29).
In contrast, the “cognitive” model, where risk perception is
conceptualized as an antecedent of affect, seems to be better
speciﬁed in terms of predictive ability—given the magnitude
of the personal experience to risk perception path (nearly double)
and improved R2=0.05 (Figure 5). Moreover, a detailed
inspection of the direct and indirect effects (followed by a
mediation test) indicates that the impact of personal experience
on affect is in fact fully mediated by risk perception (z=5.67,
SE=0.05, p< .001).
In terms of overall model ﬁt, the “cognitive” model
(Figure 5) also has a lower χ2 (51) = 378.75, p< .001 than
the “affective” model (Figure 4) χ2 (51) = 402.71, p< .001—
which is preferable. Yet, because these models are nonnested
(i.e., one model is not simply a more restricted version of the
other), the parsimony ﬁt indices are also compared to further
assess model ﬁt. The differences in the Akaike Information
Criterion Δ(AIK) =24 and the ΔBIC =23 are strongly in
favor of the “cognitive” model. Although both models seem
to have a reasonable absolute ﬁt (RMSEA = 0.09), the
“cognitive” model is clearly superior in terms of its R2 and
relative ﬁt—where personal experience is best conceptualized
as a predictor of risk perception and, in turn, risk perception a
predictor of affect (i.e., affect is post-cognitive).
A Dual-Process Model of Risk Perception and Affect
The aforementioned recursive (i.e., unidirectional) models
provide few clues about the potentially interdependent and
reciprocal relationship between risk perception and affect.
Therefore, a logical next step is to compare the recursive
“cognitive” model to a dual-process model where risk percep-
tion and affect simultaneously inﬂuence each other. Yet, in
order to estimate a nonrecursive (feedback) model, each of
the endogenous variables (risk perception and affect) requires
an exogenous instrument. As hypothesized in the introduction,
without any (conscious) cognitive attribution of the risk event,
personal experience with extreme weather seems to have little
theoretical connection with affectivity toward climate change.
The data support this hypothesis, given that the effect of per-
sonal experience on affect is fully mediated by risk perception.
In fact, as Table 2 indicates, while personal experience is
signiﬁcantly correlated to risk perception (r= .22, p< .001),Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 44, 430–440 (2014)
Figure 4. Affect as an information processing heuristic (the “affective” model). Entries are standardized beta coefﬁcients. Only main results
are depicted for easy of interpretation, *p < 0.05;**p < 0.01;***p < 0.001.
Figure 5. Affect as a post-cognitive process (the “cognitive” model). Entries are standardized beta coefﬁcients. Only main results are depicted
for easy of interpretation, *p < 0.05;**p < 0.01;***p < 0.001.
Personal experience, affect and risk perception 435it is only marginally related to affect (r= .08, p< .05). Thus,
personal experience naturally functions as a viable instrument
for risk perception.
The second instrument employed is knowledge about the
causes of climate change. It was hypothesized that knowledge
about the physical causes of climate change would share a© 2014 The Authors. European Journal of Social Psychology published by Johnweak theoretical relationship with risk perception but not with
affect. This notion is also supported, as Table 2 clearly shows
that cause knowledge is signiﬁcantly related to affect (r = .22,
p< .001) but only marginally to risk perception (r = .09,
p< .05). Moreover, the effect of cause knowledge on
risk perception is fully mediated by affect (z= 6.10, SE = 0.01,Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 44, 430–440 (2014)
436 S. van der Lindenp< .001). One potential concern to keep in mind is that if the
instruments have differential effects on their corresponding
endogenous variables, the variable with the weaker instrument
will have a greater disturbance term (Wong & Law, 1999).
The recursive “cognitive”model is estimated ﬁrst (Figure 6)
and subsequently compared with the reciprocal (nonrecursive)
model (Figure 7).
A few observations are immediately evident. First, to miti-
gate concerns about the instruments, their standardized effect
on each of the corresponding endogenous variables appears
to be equal (β= .17, SE= 0.03, p< .001 vs. β = .18, SE= 0.03,
p< .001). Second, both of the path coefﬁcients, from risk
perception to affect (β = .40, SE = 0.15, p< .01) and from
affect to risk perception (β = .45, SE = 0.12, p< .001), are
signiﬁcant. Third, the overall explained variance (R2 = 0.41)
of the reciprocal (dual-process) model is substantially higher
than that of the unidirectional model (R2 = 0.09).
In terms of model ﬁt, because the two models are nested
(i.e., one is a less restricted version of the other), a Chi-square
difference test was performed. The difference inΔχ2 (1) = 9.45
between the two models is signiﬁcant (p< .01), indicating that
the nonrecursive (i.e., reciprocal) model ﬁts the observed
variance-covariance matrix better than the unidirectional
model. The difference in the parsimony ﬁt indices, ΔAIC
(6) and ΔBIC (3) are equally in favor of the reciprocal
model (Figure 7). To further examine the plausibility of the
bi-directional relationship, the path coefﬁcients between risk
perception and affect were constrained to be equal (this adds
a degree of freedom as now only one path needs to be esti-
mated, causing the model to be overidentiﬁed). The differenceFigure 6. Recursive structural equation model. Entries are standardize
**p < 0.01;***p < 0.001.
© 2014 The Authors. European Journal of Social Psychology published by Johnin Δχ2 (1) = 2.19 between the constrained and freely
estimated model is not signiﬁcant, indicating that the two path
coefﬁcients are equal. Lastly, the functional equilibrium
assumption was tested. A stable model returns an index
eigenvalue between 0 and 1. Since the returned value was
0.41, the nonrecursive model satisﬁed the stability condition
(Bentler & Freeman, 1983). Overall, these ﬁndings strongly
point to the conclusion that a nonrecursive model (where risk
perception and affect reciprocally inﬂuence each other)
provides a better and more plausible ﬁt to the data than a
recursive (i.e., unidirectional) model.DISCUSSIONA Causal Tale: Personal Experience with Extreme
Weather, Negative Affective Evaluations, and Risk
Perceptions of Climate Change.
The current study set out to explore the complex and intricate
causal relationship between personal experience with extreme
weather events, negative affect, and risk perceptions of climate
change. Using a SEM approach, three competing theories were
contrasted, namely, (i) the “affective” model (where affect is
seen as information processing heuristic), (ii) the “cognitive”
model (where affect is seen as a post-cognitive process), and
(iii) a “dual-process” model that integrates aspects from both
theoretical perspectives. Results initially provided support for
the post-cognitive speciﬁcation, where personal experienced beta coefﬁcients. Endogenous variables covary freely, *p < 0.05;
Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 44, 430–440 (2014)
Figure 7. Nonrecursive (dual-process) structural equation model. Entries are standardized beta coefﬁcients. Endogenous variables covary
freely. R2’s are Bentler–Raykov squared multiple correlations (Bentler & Raykov, 2000), *p < 0.05;**p < 0.01;***p < 0.001.
Personal experience, affect and risk perception 437predicts risk perception and, in turn, risk perception predicts
(negative) affect. However, further examination of the
relationship between risk perception and affect revealed that
while personal experience is indeed best conceptualized as a pre-
dictor of risk perception, a mutually reinforcing and reciprocal
relationship between affect and risk perception provides a
signiﬁcantly better ﬁt to the data than a unidirectional model.
Toward a Dual-Processing Perspective
Previous research has noted that because climate change (as an
object) cannot be experienced directly, it fails to activate a
primal affective/associative risk response (Weber, 2006). In
fact, it has been suggested that in order for an individual to
develop negative affectivity toward climate change, that
individual must ﬁrst cognitively attribute personal experience
with extreme weather to climate change (Helgeson et al.,
2012; Weber, 2010). Results of the current study are congruent
with this post-cognitive interpretation, as the effect of personal
experience with extreme weather events is fully mediated by
risk perception. These results strongly suggest that people ﬁrst
perceive, interpret, and appraise risk events in terms of their
personal meaning and relevance (at least in the context of
climate change). As such, these results are consistent with
appraisal theory (e.g., Böhm, 2003; Lazarus, 1984; Nerb &
Spada, 2001; Zaalberg, Midden, Meijnders, & McCalley,
2009), other risk perception studies (e.g., Kobbeltved et al.,
2005; Yang & Kahlor, 2013), and recent research that has pro-
vided evidence for a reciprocal relationship between personal
experience and belief certainty that climate change is happen-
ing (Myers et al., 2012).© 2014 The Authors. European Journal of Social Psychology published by JohnIt is important to note that these results by no means
negate the role of affect as a fast and associative response
heuristic that guides information processing and risk
judgments, as suggested by Zajonc (1980) and Slovic et al.
(2004). In fact, it is very likely that extreme weather events
trigger biologically hard-wired affective reactions (e.g., an
impending hurricane is likely to stir up negative emotional
reactions). Yet, the experienced affect is geared toward the
risk object (i.e., the hurricane) and does not necessarily inﬂu-
ence perceptions of climate change (unless a conscious link
between the extreme weather event and climate change is
made salient). However, as this study shows, once this link
is established, negative affective reactions appear to be a
strong determinant of climate change risk perceptions, where
risk perception and affect mutually reinforce each other in a
stable feedback system. This is consistent with prior research
that has shown that affective judgments of climate change
predict cognitive risk perceptions and vice versa (Sundblad
et al., 2007).
In conclusion, the current study strongly suggests that
(at least in the context of climate change) both theoretical
perspectives hold true: affect can be seen as a post-cognitive
process as well as an information processing heuristic that
guides perceptions of risk. These ﬁndings are entirely con-
sistent with research that has pointed out the interrelated
neurological connections between the brain’s subcortical
and neocortical structures (e.g., LeDoux, 1995; Pessoa,
2008) and provide further empirical evidence for the validity
of dual-processing theories that highlight the interplay
between cognition and emotion (e.g., Loewenstein et al.,
2001; Sloman, 1996; van der Linden, 2014).Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 44, 430–440 (2014)
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The practical value of this research is evident in that risk
perception, and the experiential system in general has been
implicated as an important determinant of actions to help reduce
climate change (e.g., O’Connor et al., 1999; Leiserowitz, 2006;
Marx et al., 2007; Semenza et al., 2008; Spence et al., 2011).
Results of this study suggest that in order to design effective
social-psychological interventions, risk communication mes-
sages should take into account the interrelated nature of personal
experience, affect, and risk perception and the way in which
these variables shape perceptions of and beliefs about climate
change. Indeed, the interactive engagement of both cognitive
and emotional processing mechanisms is key to fostering more
public involvement with climate change.
For example, based on the ﬁndings of this study and others
(e.g., Myers et al., 2012; Capstick & Pidgeon, 2014), risk
communication campaigns should try to emphasize the
association between more frequent extreme weather events
and climate change. Particularly, because once this link is
made salient, a mutually reinforcing relationship between risk
perception and affect is established. In addition, results sug-
gest that negative affective evaluations can also be elicited
by improving the public’s (cognitive) knowledge of the human
causes of climate change. In turn, negative affect is then likely
to further guide information-seeking behavior (e.g., Yang &
Kahlor, 2013). Facilitating the cognition-emotion link is
congruent with recent research on climate change communi-
cation, which equally suggests that appealing to both cogni-
tive and affective processing mechanisms is likely to be a
more successful approach (van der Linden, 2014).
Some Final Thoughts on Cognition, Emotion, Causality,
and Future Research
It is well known that the cognition versus emotion debate
in psychology is held back by semantics (Kleinginna &
Kleinginna, 1985; LeDoux, 1995). In other words, the rela-
tionship between cognition and affect, to some extent, depends
on how we choose to deﬁne these concepts. I should therefore
note that the risk perception measures used in this study might
not be entirely cognitive, and similarly, measures of affect
might not be judged as purely emotional either, depending
on the reader’s personal deﬁnition of these concepts. Yet, they
do not need to be, the standardized measures used in the
current study display sufﬁcient convergent and discriminant
validity. Moreover, the purpose of this paper has been to illus-
trate how these psychological constructs function in relation to
each other in the context of climate change. In line with the
views expressed by Lai et al. (2012), future research is advised
to move away from discussing semantics and instead focus on
exploring the functional relationships between cognitive and
experiential constructs in speciﬁc contexts.
In addition, I would like to offer a ﬁnal note on the term
“causality” and how it relates to SEM. As Pearl (2012) sum-
marized, the critical reader might ask, “structural equation
modeling cannot prove causation” so how can it yield results
that have a causal interpretation? (p. 1). While it is true that
no statistical method can in or by itself truly prove “causality,”
the current study stresses that through a combination of theory© 2014 The Authors. European Journal of Social Psychology published by Johnand observation, parameters can certainly have a causal
interpretation (Iacobucci, 2009; Pearl, 2012) and encourages
the view that SEM should be seen as a tool to assess the
plausibility of different hypothesized causal path relationships
(based on how well such theoretical structures ﬁt the observed
variance-covariance matrix).
As Fabrigar, Porter, and Norris (2010) state,
If one model is found to be clearly superior to other models,
a researcher might reasonably make the case that certain
causal assumptions are more plausible than others for the
given dataset (p. 222).
It is always good to keep in mind that depending on (i) one’s
philosophy of causality, (ii) the data at hand and (iii) the extent
to which all the assumptions of a given statistical method are
met, “it will not in general be indisputably clear that an experi-
mental approach accords with all the criteria for causation better
than a nonexperimental approach” (Bagozzi, 2010, p. 210).
Human social life is invariably complex and attaining a
better understanding of causal relationships necessitates a
methodology that is ﬂexible and dynamic enough to model
intricate behavioral systems. To this extent, SEM can help
researchers offer tentative causal conclusions (Bullock,
Harlow, & Mulaik, 1994; Fabrigar et al., 2010; Markus,
2010). The emphasis here is on the term tentative, and future
research in this area could constructively build on the current
study by using experimental techniques as well as panel data
to further assess the causal structure between personal experi-
ence, risk perception, and affect. In particular, future studies
could explore how these relationships are likely to function
and behave over time as well as how they relate to intention
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